Dans le cadre des principes contenus dans la Déclaration de Paris sur l’efficacité de l’aide, et dans une volonté de favoriser la mobilisation de ressources extérieures pour le développement du pays, le Gouvernement de Guinée Bissau souhaite mettre en place un cadre de coordination et de gestion de l’aide.

Ce cadre permettra de prendre en compte les initiatives de coordination des bailleurs de fonds  en les intégrant dans une initiative plus large, sous un leadership national, conformément aux engagements de la Déclaration de Paris.

Afin de permettre à la partie nationale de jouer pleinement son rôle de leader dans le partenariat avec les bailleurs des fonds, le PNUD souhaite fournir un soutien au développement des capacités nationales de gestion et de coordination de l’aide.

Guinea-Bissau experienced civil strife and political instability in the 1980s and early 1990s, which culminated in a civil war in 1998/99. A peace agreement led to the election of President Yala in 2000. In September 2003, a military coup ousted the government of President Yala, and established a transitional Government to prepare for new elections. In a legislative election held in March 2004, the former political opposition won a majority in the National Assembly and established a new Government headed by Prime Minister Gomes Júnior. A hotly contested presidential election held in June and July 2005 saw the victory of a former military ruler, João Vieira, who took office only in October 2005 because of political unrest following the election. In November 2005, President Vieira appointed a new Government headed by Prime Minister Aristides Gomes. An elected President and the appointment of a new Government have helped restore some political stability. The military background of the President commands respect within the military, which expanded significantly during the civil war. However, transition to peace and democracy remains fragile. In April 2006, the army conducted military operations against one of the Casamance rebel factions at the Northern border with Senegal.

Sierra Leone is a West African country with a population of 6 million. In 2006, the country had a gross national income (GNI) of USD 850 per capita (in purchasing power parity terms). The GNI grew by 7.1% in 2006, a growth rate roughly similar to that of the previous two years. Sierra Leone is a low income country which, since the peace agreement was signed in 1999, has begun to emerge from eleven years of civil war. As a result of the conflict, there is extensive poverty; the most recent poverty survey, carried out in 1989 before the civil war began, estimated that 57% of the population lived below the one-dollar-per-day international poverty line. Diamonds account for 95% of the country’s exports.

Ownership

Although Sierra Leone did not participate in the 2006 Baseline Survey, it received a World Bank rating of D for that year, a rating received by 21% of participating countries. This indicates that some elements of an operational development strategy exist and provide a basis for making progress. For the 2008 Survey, Sierra Leone increased its rating to C indicating that some progress is being made, but more is needed.

Alignment

The data suggest that Sierra Leone has made very good progress, particularly given the relatively low capacity of the government sector in increasing the reliability of country systems, though donors have not made such good progress in using these systems. In addition, the country is making some progress in other dimensions including better integrating project implementation units (PIUs) into government systems, but that there is substantial room for progress as regards co-ordinated capacity development, the use by donors of country systems, and in year predictability. Progressing further will be a challenge and will require the government to exercise stronger leadership.

Harmonisation

Sierra Leone has made reasonable progress on joint missions and joint country analytical work. According to the 2008 Survey, it has already exceeded the 2010 target and is showing signs that further improvement is possible in these two areas. More generally, progress is being made toward strengthening donor partnerships. Increasing government leadership will help donors move toward developing more programme-based approaches (PBAs).

Managing for Results

Sierra Leone received a rating of D on managing for result in 2007, indicating some basis for progress, either through existing mechanisms or through definite plans. However, the rating remains unchanged from 2005. The 2010 target is for countries to move up one grade in the rating; for Sierra Leone, the target is a C grade.

Mutual Accountability

Sierra Leone has not yet put in place a joint framework to assess government and donor performance in strengthening aid effectiveness. In 2005, the consultative group established a taskforce to identify actions to enhance aid effectiveness. However, the country does not have the necessary mechanisms and no assessment has taken place. Considerably more work will need to be carried out on both sides in order to meet this target.

This report presents the findings of a review of Sierra Leone’s aid coordination architecture. It assesses Sierra Leone’s aid environment by analyzing aid patterns, the development partner structure and the quality of aid relationships against the background of the fragile state dimension. Further, the report reviews selected elements of the existing aid coordination architecture and makes concrete recommendations on how these can be further strengthened and improved. Where appropriate, this report presents relevant experiences and lessons learned from other developing countries, for example regarding, budget support, joint assistance strategies, use of project implementation units and independent monitoring groups. This study was commissioned by UNDP Sierra Leone and included a comprehensive desk review, as well as a three-week in-country mission.

Sierra Leone is a highly aid-dependent country, which shows signs of state fragility. The country’s government institutions have limited capacities to perform key functions, which affects their ability to adequately respond to citizens’ needs and potentially undermines their legitimacy. The staffing structure and skill level of many formal institutions is insufficient. State institutions are not robust and lack a professional civil service culture. This has consequences for the applicability of the aid effectiveness framework outlined in the Paris Declaration, which is premised on a sufficient level of agreement between a national government and its development partners on development goals and priorities, and sufficient capacity of the national government to take forward its programmes and policies effectively. Consequently, a concern with ‘aid effectiveness’ (i.e. the extent to which aid contributes to achieving development goals) needs to be supplemented by a more fundamental concern with the effectiveness, accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy of the institutions of state. This means that engagement by development partners must explicitly address the agenda of state-building, as well as the agenda of increasing aid effectiveness.

Finding the right balance between both objectives is a particular challenge for development partners in Sierra Leone, where informal mechanisms and institutions such as personal patronage networks and social forms of governance are prominent, and where local politics tend to determine policy outcomes. As a result, there are tensions between the need of the state to maintain fragile power balances between competing interests, on the one hand, and the goal of achieving more effective, transparent and accountable use of public resources including aid, on the other. In this regard, it is important that development agencies be much more aware of the influence of local politics on growth and development, as well as of the resulting timescales required for state-building.

This report argues for a wider use of political economy analysis, to identify factors that influence political incentives for ruling elites to support change in direction of propoor economic growth and development, as well as broad-based service delivery. Taking the importance of local politics into account may require a rethinking of common approaches to growth and good governance. Good governance and related approaches to public sector reform, as typically practiced by development agencies, are often based on an unspoken assumption that it is possible and desirable to transplant institutional models from OECD countries to the developing world.

However, experience has shown that OECD-type institutions are often not suited to developing countries, and work differently in different social and political environments. The importance of understanding and adequately addressing local politics may further require development agencies to make organizational changes, for example regarding staffing structures, recruitment procedures and internal incentives. Many development agencies in Sierra Leone experience a high staff turnover and use ad hoc approaches with a focus on short-term results, instead of long-term approaches that are based on a thorough understanding of political realities.

Sierra Leone has a diverse development partner community. Only 5 donors account for the majority of assistance, while a high number of smaller development agencies, a few non-DAC donors and numerous non-governmental organizations are involved in various aid activities. This structure is contributing to aid volatility and fragmentation with some negative consequences.

Foreign assistance provided to Sierra Leone is not coordinated very well. There is a high degree of fragmentation of responsibilities for the mobilization, negotiation and administration of aid across agencies of government, leading to inefficiencies and reduced effectiveness in the overall system. Further, there are limited efforts by the wider development partner community to coordinate activities among themselves. Isolated coordination and harmonization efforts among specific donor groups, such as the Multi-Donor Budget Support Group or European Union member states, have not yet resulted in a significant rationalization of aid activities. Besides, as they are not government-led and pursued almost independently of one another, these isolated initiatives bear the risk of turning donor groups into ‘aid cartels’.

One consequence of this limited coordination is a high degree of fragmentation of foreign assistance at the sector level, which is characterized by a large number of donors that fund a large number of financially small projects. This results in an increased coordination challenge and high transaction costs for the government, as well as in wasteful duplication of efforts and overlaps in the delivery of aid. Aid funding flows are erratic, which affects project implementation and wider economic stability. Besides, volatile aid funding can undermine attempts to build more institutionalized and predictable policy and budget processes, and so reinforce patronage networks.

In general, aid relationships in Sierra Leone are characterized by a significant lack of trust between the government and its development ‘partners’. In light of the weak capacity and concerns regarding fiduciary risks, development agencies tend to establish parallel structures, which create tensions in the civil service and undermine national ownership, domestic accountability and longer-term institution-building. Also, due to the high degree of aid dependency, the power relation between the government and its partners is asymmetrical. Numerous conditionalities imposed by the largest donors result in one-dimensional accountability of the government to the donors and impede domestic accountability of the government to its citizens.

Given the lack of mutual trust, the high level of aid dependency coupled with weak government structures and capacities, and the resultant assertive donor behavior, which is not always conducive to fostering national ownership and mutual accountability, it is not surprising that Sierra Leone has not moved forward more quickly in improving the aid system and in implementing more effective aid coordination and management mechanisms.

Against this background, it is recommended that government and development agencies jointly formulate and mutually sign an Aid Effectiveness Action Plan that outlines concrete actions by both sides to improve aid effectiveness and aid relationships. This plan would serve as an operational tool to implement the government’s aid policy. In order to increase mutual accountability, it is recommended that an Independent Monitoring Group be established consisting of renowned external experts. This group would periodically carry out independent assessments of the status of aid relationships and the progress made with regard to improving aid effectiveness and implementing the mutual commitments made in the joint aid effectiveness action plan.

Although Sierra Leone has the basic structure of a good formal machinery of dialogue, the overall effectiveness of the collective dialogue and coordination mechanisms is limited. It is crucial to establish better linkages between dialogue mechanisms at different levels, especially between the Consultative Group (CG) and the Development Partnership Committee (DEPAC), as well as between DEPAC and Sector Working Groups (SWGs). Further, the operational effectiveness of many working groups should be enhanced through better advance preparation, action oriented minutes, and wider information sharing, for example through SWG websites. Sector Working Groups should play a key role in reviewing assistance proposals and in monitoring the implementation of related activities, without substituting line ministry functions.

In order to strengthen the government’s aid coordination capacity, it is recommended that the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) be designated the lead coordinating agency for all external assistance. In this regard, a post for a Permanent Secretary, who would head the Development Division of the MoFED and report to the Financial Secretary, should be established. It is further recommended that a Development Cooperation Department be established as part of the Development Division, which should be structured by development agency desks that act as main counterparts for corresponding donor and development agencies and would be responsible for coordination and administration of external assistance along the entire aid business cycle. In addition, an Aid Effectiveness Unit (AEU) should be established, which should perform some of the functions that were previously performed by DACO, such as acting as secretariat for DEPAC. In addition, the AEU should perform knowledge-sharing functions and act as facilitator within the Development Division to ensure policy coherence, in order to avoid gaps and overlaps between development assistance portfolios of individual development agencies. Finally, the AEU should spearhead and monitor the implementation of the national aid effectiveness agenda, including implementation of the Paris Declaration Survey, supporting formulation and monitoring of an Aid Effectiveness Action Plan to support the implementation of the aid policy, etc. Further, it is recommended that a National Appraisal Committee be established under the Office of the President, comprised of representatives from different central and line ministries, as well as from other government agencies and external institutions, such as universities. The main function of the Appraisal Committee would be to review and approve foreign aid and investment proposals.

The Sierra Leone Development Assistance Database (DAD) is a useful and tool for tracking foreign aid provided to the country. However, its effectiveness as a tool to support aid coordination and foster alignment is currently limited due to the fact that many development agencies do not enter data into the system in a timely and sufficiently disaggregated manner. In addition, the MoFED, the institutional host of the system, currently practices insufficient process management. In this regard, the data entry process should be firmly institutionalized, by linking it to the budget cycle and making data provision mandatory. Further, more proactive outreach to development agencies will be required through the proposed development partner desks, as well as proactive and client-oriented preparation of analytical products, such as sector, district and partner profiles by the proposed Research, Planning and M&E Department. The government should further consider implementing a limited number of system enhancements to increase DAD’s analytical capacities. The suggested modifications include the possibility to breakdown multi-year commitments into yearly allocations (potentially combined with a planned disbursement schedule), as well as the possibility to track ‘expenditures’ and Paris Declaration Indicators. The latter would include an electronic calendar where development partners could record their planned missions and analytical works, with the aim to coordinate both better.

Based on a review of other options for regulatory frameworks for foreign assistance, such as a law or a joint assistance strategy, it is recommended that a succinct aid policy document be formulated – one that mainly stays at the level of basic principles and defines the main procedures and corresponding roles and responsibilities for the provision, acceptance, coordination and management of foreign assistance. The policy should be concrete, but at the same time broad enough to encompass the entire development partner community. The current draft provides a good starting point.

In order to facilitate the actual implementation of the policy, it is recommended that a joint aid effectiveness action plan be formulated, which could combine localized Paris Declaration principles with operational targets regarding the provision, coordination and management of foreign assistance. The action plan would be a ‘living document’ that would be adjusted in line with changing realities on the ground and would progress towards more advanced targets. The action plan would define concrete steps government and development agencies commit to undertake, together with timelines and measurable targets, for example regarding the phasing out of (parallel) project implementation units and full integration of contract staff into the civil service structure.

Finally, this report makes a number of recommendations on the draft aid policy document presented during the DEPAC meeting in May 2009, including that the roles and responsibilities within the aid process should be further clarified; that the government should express its preference for an ‘aid mix’, instead of stating budget support as first priority; and that the government should reserve the right to refuse aid that is not aligned with its priorities.

Sierra Leone receives important aid inflows from the bilateral and multilateral donor community. The Government therefore needs to improve coherence between the different development partners as much as it needs to improve structures for aid coordination, harmonisation and alignment. This requirement stems from both international agreements to which Sierra Leone and many of its partners are a signatory such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action, the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, and the Government’s overarching vision for making aid work efficiently for the people of Sierra Leone. It is also consistent with the internal Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Sierra Leone and its multi donor budget support partners (MDBS). Accordingly, this document sets out the first ever comprehensive aid policy of the Government of Sierra Leone. It provides guidelines for the mobilisation and implementation of development assistance in Sierra Leone, in order to improve its effectiveness and assert GoSL leadership over its aid inflows. The document is based on previous work and extensive consultations in country with the various stakeholders in development. The consultative process is outlined in Box I below.

 

It is important to emphasise that although input was sought from all stakeholders in the development process, the final decision on content rested with the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), as the leader and driver of the process. In the resulting Aid Policy, all the stakeholders now have a practical blueprint to enhance aid effectiveness and monitor progress. The Aid Policy clearly articulates what the Government will do to make aid more effective, and to ensure that it is directed in a manner that provides maximum impact on economic development and poverty alleviation.

Local aid coordination structure in the oPT
(last updated Jan 2010) 

The currently existing aid coordination structure in the oPT was set up following the decision made at the meeting of the AHLC on 14 December 2005 in London to improve the effectiveness of aid coordination structures in providing coherent technical assistance and financial support based on national priorities to the Palestinian people in line with the OECD-DAC Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

At the local level, the coordination structure[1] currently comprises:

1. A Local Development Forum (LDF) which is open to PA representatives and all donor and aid agencies as well as to the representative of Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA). The LDF is co-chaired by the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MoPAD), together with Norway, the World Bank and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO). LDF meetings are planned and prepared through meetings of the LDF co-chairs and Friends of the Co-Chairs. Since October 2007 LDF meetings have been chaired by the Palestinian Prime Minister.

2. Four Strategy Groups (SGs) which deal with the main clusters of economic policy, governance, infrastructure development and social development and humanitarian issues. The SGs focus on policy formulation and programmatic coordination, and pursue better design of donor projects to support the PA’s sector priorities as well as a higher degree of harmonization of donor procedures. Membership is limited and based on clearly added financial or analytical value of the respective agency.

These four SGs are co-chaired as follows:

The Governance Strategy Group is co-chaired by the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development and the European Commission (EC); the Economic Strategy Group is co-chaired by the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank; the Social Development Strategy Group is co-chaired by the Ministry of Social Affairs and UNSCO. The Infrastructure Strategy Group is co-chaired by the Ministry of Housing and Public Works and USAID.

3. The SGs are supported by the work of thirteen main sub-groups[2] - namely twelve Sector Working Groups (SWGs) and one working group - that report to the SGs. These are functional groups which are the main instrument of coordination between the PA and the donor community at the technical level. The following SWGs currently exist: Agriculture, Fiscal, Private Sector Development and Trade, Water and Sanitation, Environmental, Municipal Development and Local Governance, Environment, Health, Education, Social Protection, Judiciary, Public Administration and Civil Service, and Security. In addition, the Working Group on Elections also reports to the Governance SG.

The Infrastructure SG is supported by two thematic sub-groups on Solide Waste and Affordable Housing.

The Social Development SG is supported by a Humanitarian Task Force.

The Economic SG is supported by a Micro and Small Finance Task Force.

The Education SWG is further supported by a Thematic Group on Higher Education, while the Health SWG is supported by the National Nutrition Steering Committee and the following five Thematic Groups: the Pharmaceutical Thematic Group, the Mental Health Thematic Group, Non-Communicable Diseases Thematic Group and Women’s and Children’s Health Thematic Group. 

The Fiscal SWG is supported by a Fiscal Task Force.

4. A Task Force on Project Implementation (TFPI) which liaises with the GoI on issues of project implementation and comprises USAID, UNSCO, EC, the World Bank. The TFPI has a rotating Chairmanship with each member taking on the position of Chair for a six-month period. The last meeting of the TFPI was held in May 2007.

5. The LDF, SGs, SWGs and TFPI are supported by the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS). LACS and its seven staff are sponsored/funded by Norway, World Bank, UNSCO, USAID and Germany. The work of these groups is further supported by four Strategy Group Coordinators provided by the World Bank, EC, UNSCO and USAID.

 

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[1] Please refer to graph on local aid coordination structures

[2] Please refer to matrix on membership in aid coordination structures in the oPT (LDF, SGs and SWGs)

Depuis 2006, la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) s'est engagée dans la mise en oeuvre du Document de la stratégie de croissance et de réduction de la pauvreté (DSCRP). Un Programme d’actions prioritaires (PAP) pour la mise en oeuvre de ce DSCRP a été réalisé en 2007 et constitue la première étape dans la marche vers la reconstruction du pays à travers les cinq chantiers de la RDC, le programme du gouvernement, le contrat de gouvernance et le cadre d’assistance pays (CAP) des partenaires au développement. La RDC a souscrit à la Déclaration de Paris sur l’efficacité de l’aide. La question de l’efficacité de l’aide dans ce pays, qui sort d’une longue période de guerre civile, préoccupe la communauté internationale.

 

1. Appropriation : La RDC a obtenu une note D en 2007. Les mesures prises par le pays sont en effet trop récentes pour se traduire par une réelle amélioration de l’appropriation. Après une décennie de conflits, la RDC est pourtant en voie de réaliser des progrès importants en matière institutionnelle, économique et sociale.

 

2. Alignement : Seulement 20% de l’aide est prévisible par l’administration nationale, ce qui reflète la difficulté de cette dernière à obtenir au moment de la préparation du budget et à enregistrer dans son système comptable les versements des donneurs.

D’ailleurs, la valeur de 2007 pour la RDC ressort à 58 %, mais elle pourrait donc être plus réaliste compte tenu des problèmes d’alignement et d’harmonisation. Plusieurs facteurs permettent d’expliquer la sous-évaluation notable de l’aide dans le budget. Ceux-ci sont liés à la fois aux comportements des donneurs et aux dysfonctionnements des systèmes nationaux. En RDC, les donneurs avaient programmé de verser 798 millions USD en 2007, mais seulement 20 % de cette somme, soit 156 millions USD ont été enregistrés comme décaissement par le gouvernement. Il reste que l’alignement de l’aide est, de ce point de vue, extrêmement faible.

 

3. Harmonisation : En RDC, 21% des donneurs soutiennent des approches-programmes pour une infime proportion de l’aide globale. De plus, 23 % des travaux d’analyse sont réalisés conjointement, ce qui représente moins de la moitié de l’objectif fixé dans la Déclaration de Paris pour 2010 (66 %).

 

4. Gestion axée sur les résultats : La RDC a obtenu la note de D en 2007. Le pays a connu peu de progrès dans l’utilisation des cadres d’évaluation des performances permettant d’effectuer le suivi des programmes et projets.

 

5. Responsabilité mutuelle : Dans la mesure où il n’existe en RDC aucun cadre harmonisé de concertation mutuelle, aucune évaluation mutuelle des progrès accomplis n’a été réalisée en 2007. Le rapport de l’enquête 2006 insistait sur la faible implication du gouvernement dans les évaluations des projets et l’examen des progrès réalisés et recommandait aux donneurs et aux pays bénéficiaires de l’aide de se rendre compte mutuellement de l’utilisation qui est faite des ressources affectées au développement. Il est ainsi nécessaire de mettre en place un cadre harmonisé et mutuel d’évaluation des progrès accomplis et d’en informer davantage les populations.

 

La RDC est un Etat fagile qui sort à peine d’une longue période de guerre. Cela signifie que l’atteinte des objectifs-cibles pour 2010 par la RDC sera plus difficile que pour un « État non fragile » et qu’elle ira probablement au-delà du terme globalement fixé pour tous les pays signataires. Bien que des mesures très appréciables aient été prises, d’importants défis restent encore à relever au niveau de l’amélioration de l’efficacité de l’aide. Dans le domaine de l’alignement, les résultats obtenus indiquent que s’il y a globalement alignement politique des donneurs asur le DSCRP et sur quelques stratégies sectorielles (santé, enseignement primaire), celui-ci est en réalité encore peu opérationnel du fait des carences des systèmes nationaux. Du point de vue de l’harmonisation, le faible développement des aproches programmes empêche le gouvernement d’exercer le leadership dans la conduite des opérations relatives aux programmes financés par les donneurs. Enfin, en dépit des efforts pour améliorer les capacités statistiques des pays, il n’existe pas encore de véritable cadre d’évaluation des performances permettant d’effectuer le suivi des programmes et projets.

Agenda de Kinshasa

 

Le présent Agenda de Kinshasa est le fruit du Forum National de Haut Niveau sur l’Efficacité de l’Aide, organicé par le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo les 15 et 16 juin, 2009 à Kinshasa.

Le Forum avait pour but d’engager le Gouvernement, les Partenaires au Développement, et les organizations de la société civile sur des measures concrètes pour améliorer l’éfficacité de l’aide. A cette fin, le Forum a examiné les trois sujets suivants :

• La répartition et l’adéquation de l’aide,
• Les mécanismes et instruments de mise en oeuvre des programmes pour les secteurs prioritaires, et
• L’architecture de l’aide.

Le Forum National de Haut Niveau sur l’Efficacité de l’Aide se situe dans la ligne d’une série d’initiatives internationales, notamment les OMDs, la Déclaration de Paris et l’Agenda d’Action d’Accra, visant à améliorer l’efficacité de l’aide et partant les résultars de développement.

L’Agenda de Kinshasa réaffirme, en 2009, l’adhésion du Gouvernment et des Partenaires au Développement au Pacte de Performance et leur engagement mutuel à travailler ensemble pour accélérer le développment de la RDC et assurer que les ressources qu’ils y consacrent soient employées avec l’efficacité et contribuent de la manière la plus directe à l’amélioration des conditions de vie de la population et au dévelopmment durable de la RDC.

L’Agenda de Kinshasa comprend des príncipes directeurs et des mesures concrètes qui seront mis en oeuvre avec diligence et réalisme en tenant comptre du cadre que constituent les politiques et les règlements respectifs des Partenaires au Développement.

Ces príncipes et ces mesures s’appuient sur l’implication de tous les acteurs du développement, incluant la société civile et les secteur privé. La dimenson genre est prise en compte de manière transversale dans toutes les étapes du processus de coopération en tenant compte des besoins spécifiques et stratégiques des femmes. Enfin, le context particulier de la RDC es intégré, notamment l’étendue et la diversité du pays, l’importance accordée à la décentralisation, la consolidation de la paix et la situation de dysfontionnement de l’appareil d’Etat du fait de sa fragilité.

 

Mesures concrètes :

1. L’affirmation du leadership gouvernamental dans l’orientation, la coordination et la gestion de l’aide.
2. L’engagement du Gouvenement à consolider les éformes institutionnelles et des partenaires à renforcer les capacités.
3. Une meilleure division du travail entre les Partenaires au Développement et une rationalisation de leurs interventions.
4. L’engagement des deux parties à intégrer progressivement les mécanismes de mise en oeuvre dans les structures et systems nationaux.
5. Mécanisme de suivi après Forum.

Suivi des Principes d’Engagement dans les États fragiles et situations de fragilité

Rapport Pays 3 : République Démocratique du Congo

(OCDE, 2009)

 

Ce rapport fait suivi de principes pour l’engagement international dans les États fragiles et les situations précaires afin de contribuer à amélioration de l’efficacité de l’aide dans les États fragiles, en complément à la Déclaration de Paris, c’est-à-dire en l’adaptant aux défis particuliers posés par ces États.

Principe 1- Prendre le contexte comme point de départ : Il demande une lecture plus régulière qui prenne en compte le contexte socioculturel du pays. L’analyse du contexte en RDC reste multiple et fragmentée, et quand elle existe, l’information circule mal. La communauté internationale a mis en place les prémisses d’une compréhension mieux partagée du contexte congolais. Une gestion axée sur les résultats et la responsabilité mutuelle – deux principes de la Déclaration de Paris – qui demande un effort supplémentaire de partage, de suivi et d’évaluation de leurs activités.

Principe 2 - Ne pas nuire : Malgré l’existence de bonnes pratiques, principalement dans le domaine humanitaire, le diagnostic majoritairement partagé a été que la communauté internationale n’a pas su mettre en oeuvre le Principe « Ne pas nuire » en RDC. Ce Principe demande que la communauté internationale porte une attention particulière aux risques de poches d’exclusion auxquels contribuerait une mauvaise répartition de l’aide. Le Principe « Ne pas nuire » est aussi mis en perspective par une discussion concernant le mandat de la MONUC et le rôle du secteur minier.

Principe 3 - Faire du renforcement de l’état l’objectif fundamental : Ce principe comme objectif fondamental semble bien intégré dans les choix d’intervention de la communauté internationale. Toutefois, l’absence de résultats visibles, le manque d’implication de l’administration publique dans l’exécution des projets, ainsi que la trop grande visibilité de certains acteurs internationaux, expliquent des différences de points de vue de nombreux participants sur la réalité de la situation. Il faut aussi souligner la responsabilité des autorités congolaises dans ce domaine. En effet, d’après la communauté internationale, le pays a connu un immobilisme politique depuis 2006, caractérisé par de nombreux remaniements ministériels, une faible capacité des ministères et un manque de volonté et de vision politiques. Ainsi, ils expliquent que les délais de mise en oeuvre des programmes financés par les bailleurs de fonds soient pour partie dus à des retards au niveau des réformes institutionnelles et législatives.

Principe 4 - Accorder la priorité à la prévention : La contribution de la communauté internationale à la gestion et prévention des crises en RDC a été soulignée. Toutefois, la consolidation de la paix va de paire avec le renforcement de l’État. Ainsi, la communauté internationale doit non seulement maintenir ses efforts de médiation, mais aussi soutenir des programmes de plus long terme, absolument nécessaires à la prévention des conflits. L’analyse et le suivi régulier des causes de conflit et la reconstruction du tissu social en particulier, ont été identifiés par beaucoup comme des priorités.

Principe 5 - Reconnaître qu’il existe des liens entre les objectifs politiques, sécuritaires et de développement : Les liens entre les objectifs politiques, sécuritaires et de développement sont déjà bien assimilés dans les discours sous le sigle « 3 D » (Diplomatie, Défense, Développement) et ont bien été pris en compte dans les programmes du gouvernement. La communauté internationale connaît toutefois des résultats encore limités dans son soutien à la réforme du secteur de sécurité.

Principe 6 - Promouvoir la non-discrimination comme fondement de sociétés stables et sans exclus : La RDC est perçue comme discriminée par rapport à d’autres pays, le niveau d’aide par habitant étant plus bas que la moyenne en Afrique sub-saharienne. La mauvaise répartition de l’aide aurait aussi contribué à la création de poches d’exclusion. S’agissant de promouvoir la non-discrimination au sein du pays, l’engagement positif de la communauté internationale a été le plus visible dans la promotion et la protection des femmes. Ailleurs, leur influence sur la lutte contre l’impunité, la corruption et les atteintes aux droits de l’homme – causes récurrentes de la discrimination envers les plus faibles en RDC – est perçue comme faible.

Principe 7 - S’aligner sur les priorités locales d’une manière différente selon le contexte : L’alignement sur les priorités nationales existe à travers le Cadre d’assistance pays (CAP), le Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté (DSCRP) et le Programme d’actions prioritaires (PAP).

Toutefois, la communauté internationale n’a pas eu recours aux systèmes nationaux de passation de marché et gestion des finances publiques, considérés comme trop faibles. Un appui technique pour renforcer les systèmes nationaux (finances publiques et passation des marchés) ainsi qu’une accélération des réformes sont nécessaires. En général, la communauté internationale aurait tendance à « chercher des raccourcis » et à ne pas suffisamment impliquer les structures administratives du pays. Les bailleurs de fonds se sont engagés à réduire le nombre d’unités parallèles de mise en oeuvre (estimé à 146 dans la dernière enquête de suivi de la mise en oeuvre de la Déclaration de Paris), ce qui bénéficierait au « renforcement des capacités de gestion de projets et programmes des agents et cadres de l’administration publique ».

Quant à la nécessité de s’aligner sur les priorités sub-nationales, cela est particulièrement nécessaire dans le contexte de la décentralisation inscrite dans la Constitution, mais demeure difficile en l’absence d’une véritable politique de développement au niveau des provinces et entités territoriales décentralisées. Le PAP 2009–10 devrait permettre la mise en place de stratégies de développement au niveau des provinces et entités territoriales décentralisées, permettant ainsi aux donateurs de mieux s’aligner sur les priorités locales.

Principe 8 - S’accorder sur des mécanismes concrets de coordination de l’action des acteurs internationaux : Les participants ont reconnu les efforts de coordination des partenaires internationaux au cours de ces dernières années. Ils ont salué les bénéfices des clusters47 et du Pooled Fund dans les actions humanitaires, et la formation récente de groupes thématiques destinés à soutenir les cadres stratégiques de développement du gouvernement. Ils ont cependant reconnu le manque de coordination des actions de développement sur le terrain et le besoin d’un effort de leadership supplémentaire de la part du gouvernement.

Principe 9 Agir vite… mais rester engagé assez longtemps pour avoir des chances de réussite : En dehors de l’action humanitaire, où des mécanismes rapides d’intervention existent, les participants se sont accordés à dire que la communauté internationale n’agit pas suffisamment vite. Les mécanismes de réponse rapide d’intervention restent rares. La conception et mise en oeuvre de projets de développement semblent toujours prendre plus de temps que prévu, à cause de lourdeurs administratives tant du côté du gouvernement que du côté des bailleurs de fonds.

En revanche, la communauté internationale reconnait l’importance d’un engagement multidimensionnel sur le long terme ; les chances de réussite de leur engagement étant tributaires de leurs efforts d’évaluation et de suivi, de leur soutien aux prochaines élections, de la remise de la dette et du désengagement, à terme, de la MONUC.

Principe 10 - Éviter de créer des poches d’exclusion: Tant l’aide humanitaire que l’aide au développement sont inégalement réparties en RDC. Afin d’éviter de créer des poches d’exclusion en RDC, la communauté internationale devra faire un effort supplémentaire pour pourvoir aux besoins de la population sur l’ensemble du territoire. Et ce, tout en veillant à répartir l’aide de façon équitable à travers les différents secteurs, tout en impliquant les autorités centrales et provinciales, et en s’alignant progressivement sur les priorités locales définies par les provinces et entités territoriales décentralisées.

The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and its Development Partners recognise substantial progress in improving aid effectiveness and strengthening national ownership of the development process in Tanzania. They desire to take this further under the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), operationalising the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to which they are signatories. This Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) declares the principles of implementing the JAST that are shared by the Government and Development Partners, in order to make aid in Tanzania more effective for reducing poverty and achieving national development goals in line with the Millenium Development Goals.